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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ____________ 
 
No. 17-1692 
____________ 
 
BEKIR SAHIN, 
   Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL  
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
    Respondent 
____________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the  
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A079-707-590) 
Immigration Judge: Honorable Annie S. Garcy 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
October 10, 2017 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, SHWARTZ, and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: November 30, 2017) 
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____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
Bekir Sahin petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA). For the reasons that follow, we will deny his petition in part and dismiss in part. 
I   
A native of Turkey, Sahin married a U.S. citizen in 2002 and became a conditional 
permanent resident a year later. Just four months into the marriage, Sahin’s wife suffered 
a miscarriage, and she later filed for an annulment, alleging that Sahin’s “intention with 
respect to the marriage was fraudulent” because he “entered the marriage solely for 
purposes of attaining immigration benefits.” App. 154. In April 2004, the New Jersey 
Superior Court annulled the marriage. 
In 2006, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) terminated Sahin’s status as 
a conditional resident. Sahin then sought to remove the conditions on his lawful 
permanent resident status under 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B). Because he was no longer 
married, however, Sahin had to seek a waiver of the requirement that he file a joint 
petition with his spouse. And that waiver could be granted only if Sahin demonstrated 
that his marriage had been in “good faith.” See id. DHS denied this good faith waiver 
request, so Sahin proceeded before an Immigration Judge (IJ). After several delays 
                                                 
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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between 2010 and 2015, the IJ held a hearing and denied Sahin’s good faith waiver 
request. In doing so, the IJ relied on the finding of the New Jersey Superior Court that 
Sahin’s marriage was a sham (i.e., entered into only for immigration reasons) to hold that 
Sahin failed to carry his burden. The BIA affirmed, finding “no clear error in [the IJ’s] 
conclusion that [Sahin]’s intent, at the time of the marriage, was for an immigration 
benefit and not to create a life together.” App. 5.  
Sahin timely appealed. 
II1 
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), we lack jurisdiction to review discretionary 
denials of relief like the good faith waiver Sahin requested. Urena-Tavarez v. Ashcroft, 
367 F.3d 154, 161 (3d Cir. 2004). Recognizing this limitation, Sahin advances two 
arguments he claims to be legal or constitutional such that we may exercise jurisdiction 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). Specifically, Sahin argues that his due process rights 
were violated and that the agency assigned him the wrong burden of proof. As we shall 
explain, the first claim fails on the merits and we lack jurisdiction over the second claim. 
                                                 
1 The IJ had authority to consider the good faith waiver as a matter of discretion 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B) and the BIA had appellate jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.1(b)(3). We generally review the BIA’s opinion as a final agency decision, but 
where, as here, the BIA “invokes specific aspects of the IJ’s analysis and fact-finding,” 
we review both decisions. Green v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 503, 506 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation 
omitted). 
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A 
Sahin claims that delays in his case deprived him of due process because his ex-
wife “was no longer willing and able” to testify on his behalf and because other friends 
and potential witnesses have grown more distant. Sahin Br. 24. We are unpersuaded.  
After Sahin exhausted his pursuit of a waiver with the DHS in 2009, his case 
proceeded before the IJ. Sahin’s master calendar hearing was scheduled for February 9, 
2010, but that hearing was adjourned at the request of Sahin’s counsel, who needed time 
to prepare. At the rescheduled master calendar hearing, a date was set for the merits 
hearing in 2011. Sahin’s attorney later filed a motion to continue, requesting that the 
2011 merits hearing “be continued due to the unavailability of [Sahin’s] ex-wife.” App. 
139. In response to this motion to continue, the IJ scheduled a master calendar hearing for 
October 19, 2011, but the IJ missed the hearing when another matter ran late. At the 
rescheduled master calendar hearing in February 2012, the IJ rescheduled the merits 
hearing for April 2013 to permit Sahin’s ex-wife to testify. But that hearing was 
postponed because a Turkish interpreter was not available. The IJ then rescheduled the 
May 2014 hearing due to a family funeral. Sahin’s merits hearing was finally conducted 
on October 9, 2015. Since Sahin requested two of the five major continuances, he cannot 
credibly complain that those delays denied him due process. 
As for the other three delays, they did not prejudice Sahin. See Delgado-
Sobalvarro v. Att’y Gen., 625 F.3d 782, 787–88 (3d Cir. 2010). The BIA rightly noted 
that nothing prevented Sahin from subpoenaing his ex-wife or any other friend or family 
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member to testify at his 2015 hearing. Sahin argues that he suffered prejudice because his 
ex-wife initially was willing to testify, but later declined to do so. Nevertheless, the IJ 
still had access to an affidavit from Sahin’s ex-wife explaining that she “believed at the 
time of [their] marriage that [they] loved one another and hoped [their] marriage would 
endure.” App. 149. The IJ expressed skepticism about Sahin’s statement that his ex-wife 
no longer wished to testify because “she did not want to be reminded of the past any 
longer.” App. 12. But even had the IJ found that statement credible, Sahin’s ex-wife’s 
intentions upon entering the marriage shed no light on whether Sahin married her to 
establish a life or to obtain an immigration benefit.  
As the IJ noted, Sahin presented only his testimony to rebut the findings of the 
New Jersey Superior Court. And because Sahin has not demonstrated that the delays in 
his hearing prevented him from presenting other relevant evidence, those delays did not 
deny him due process of law. 
Sahin also argues that the IJ violated due process by demonstrating bias against 
him based on his religion, but he fails to point to any instance of bias in the record. 
Before the BIA and this Court, Sahin alleged insensitivity to his religiously motivated 
views on artificial insemination (something he claims was a point of contention with his 
ex-wife). But the IJ did not dismiss the validity of those objections; she merely noted that 
Sahin testified inconsistently in this regard. During his state court proceeding, Sahin 
expressed total opposition to the procedure, but in his immigration proceedings he 
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testified he was willing to pursue it. The IJ’s focus on these inconsistencies was neither 
erroneous nor biased.2 
B 
We turn now to Sahin’s burden of proof argument. Sahin did not argue to the BIA 
that the IJ failed to apply the preponderance of the evidence standard. Accordingly, we 
lack jurisdiction over this unexhausted claim. Castro v. Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 356, 365 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1)). And the claim would have been without merit 
in any event. Both the IJ and BIA clearly noted that Sahin was required to demonstrate 
good faith by a preponderance of the evidence, and Sahin’s real objection here relates to 
how the IJ weighed the evidence under that standard—an objection over which we also 
lack jurisdiction. Jarbough v. Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2007). 
*     *     * 
 For the reasons stated, we will deny Sahin’s petition for review in part and dismiss 
it in part. 
                                                 
2 Sahin also argues for the first time on appeal that the IJ was biased against him 
because of his weak command of English. We lack jurisdiction over that argument 
because it was not presented to the BIA. Castro v. Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 356, 365 (3d Cir. 
2012).  
 
